• The Effect of Policy Uncertainty on VC Investments Around the World. (SSRN link) With Lubomir Litov and Romora Sitorus. Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting

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Presentations: University of Oklahoma, FMA European 2019, FMA Asian 2019, 36th AFFI Conference, 2019 INFINITI Conference on International Finance, SWFA 2019, AFA 2020 Ph.D. Poster Session, FMCG 2022, JLFA Conference 2022.

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• We documents a significant negative relationship between economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and venture capital (VC) investment in startups across emerging venture capital markets.

• The adverse effect of policy uncertainty is exacerbated for younger and early-stage startups.

• The adverse effect of policy uncertainty is attenuated for startups that have headquarters in cities with a high concentration of global VC investment, in countries with more developed stock markets, or if the VC is led by a bank or a corporate.

• The EPU increases the number of financing rounds, decreases the fraction of investment amount during the first round, and reduces the likelihood of successful exit through acquisition.

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• Venture Capitalist Directors and Managerial Incentives. (SSRN link) With Lubomir Litov, William Megginson, and Romora Sitorus.

 

Media Coverage: Columbia Law School Blue Sky Blog, Oxford Business Law Blog​

Presentations: University of Oklahoma, FMA 2020, Missouri State University, University of Richmond, University of Scranton, The College of New Jersey,  FMCG 2022, FMA European 2022, World Finance Conference 2022.

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• Firms which have board members with venture capital experience (i.e., VC directors) on compensation committee are associated with greater CEO risk-taking incentives (i.e., vega) and pay-for-performance sensitivity (i.e., delta).

• Such effect is more pronounced if VC directors are from highly reputable VC firms.

• Increasing managerial incentives is a possible channel through which VC directors promote corporate innovation.

• Having VC directors on nominating and/or governance committee is associated with higher likelihood of forced CEO turnover.

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• Do Corporate Insiders Take Advantage of Their Political Connections? Evidence from Insider Trading. (SSRN link).

 

Presentations: University of Oklahoma, 37th AFFI Conference PhD Workshop, EFMA 2021, SWFA 2022, EFA 2022, FMCG 2022, FMA 2022 (Scheduled).

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• Purchases (sales) by politically connected corporate insiders are associated with lower (higher) abnormal returns compared with non-politically connected insiders, indicating that politically connected insiders in general are sophisticated and cautious about potential legal risk.

• Politically connected insiders are more likely to have longer trading horizons, and more likely to make routine trades.

• The STOCK Act passed in April 2012 effectively decreases (increases) the abnormal returns associated with insider purchases (sales) made by Congress members and staff in short horizons.

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