• Venture Capitalist Directors and Managerial Incentives. (SSRN link) With Lubomir Litov, William Megginson, and Romora Sitorus.

Media Coverage: Columbia Law School Blue Sky Blog, Oxford Business Law Blog​

Presentations: University of Oklahoma, FMA 2020, Missouri State University, University of Richmond, University of Scranton, The College of New Jersey,  FMCG 2022, FMA European 2022, World Finance Conference 2022, 6th Erasmus Corporate Governance Conference 2023, University of Chicago Law School Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (CELS) 2023.

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• Firms which have board members with venture capital experience (i.e., VC directors) on compensation committee are associated with greater CEO risk-taking incentives (i.e., vega) and pay-for-performance sensitivity (i.e., delta).

• Such effect is more pronounced if VC directors are from highly reputable VC firms.

• Increasing managerial incentives is a possible channel through which VC directors promote corporate innovation.

• Having VC directors on nominating and/or governance committee is associated with higher likelihood of forced CEO turnover.

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• Do Corporate Insiders Take Advantage of Their Political Connections? Evidence from Insider Trading. (SSRN link).

Presentations: University of Oklahoma, 37th AFFI Conference PhD Workshop, EFMA 2021, SWFA 2022, EFA 2022, FMCG 2022, FMA 2022.

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• Purchases (sales) by politically connected corporate insiders are associated with lower (higher) abnormal returns compared with non-politically connected insiders, indicating that politically connected insiders in general are sophisticated and cautious about potential legal risk.

• Politically connected insiders are more likely to have longer trading horizons, and more likely to make routine trades.

• The STOCK Act passed in April 2012 effectively decreases (increases) the abnormal returns associated with insider purchases (sales) made by Congress members and staff in short horizons.

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